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Engaging the grassroots
Engaging the grassroots
It is becoming increasingly clear that the IGAD-led mediation process in Addis Ababa will not lead to a definitive resolution to the conflict in South Sudan in the near future. Three months after the cessation of hostilities agreement, there has been no progress on implementation modalities, tabling of an agenda and declaration of principles. And yet the talks have been adjourned (yet again) to April 31st 2014 ‘to give time for the mediators to consult with the heads of IGAD’.
We have fully prioritized this externally driven process of
mediation as the sole response to the current crisis. This, despite misgivings
about whether those currently at the negotiating table fully represent the needs
and fears of the communities affected and impacted by the conflict. Indeed,
there have been numerous calls for inclusion of various stakeholders in the
Addis Ababa talks, but fewer calls for a parallel mediation process that
engages the grassroots. This must change.
It will be important to recognize that the victims and
perpetrators of this conflict are interchangeable to an extent, numbers
involved are huge and in the case of the Nuer, impact entire age-set(s). Conversely,
reasons for sustained violence continue to evolve; for some this is retaliation
– albeit, seemingly no point at which they are sated - others would like to overthrow
government, while for those in Addis, it is about political reform(s). It is
presumptuous to believe that all these differing viewpoints will be addressed
solely in Addis Ababa.
In addition, this conflict has impacted entire communities:
over one million persons displaced, there is no valid estimate of the numbers
of civilians dead but we do know that they are many and entire towns burned to
the ground. This has intensified an environment of distrust amongst communities
who will have to continue living side by side. There are also fears that this
conflict, if left to escalate further, could lead to splits within the greater
Nuer community, and that communities on the sidelines of the conflict will
become embroiled in it. We must de-escalate this situation.
Community-led processes of dialogue, truth, justice and
restitution can potentially tackle outstanding issues including how to re-establish
law and order at the grassroots; disarming or rehabilitation of armed youths
and processes for the return of the displaced persons – including perhaps
compensation. They allow communities to identify their missing and dead, and redress
grievances. Community-led peace agreements can inspire a lasting peace, leading
perhaps to a new definition of CPA; Community-led Peace Agreements.
Numerous examples of community peace-building and conflict
resolution processes exist in South Sudan. This article draws lessons from
these past efforts (see appendix), in an attempt to offer modalities for
engagement at the grassroots.
1.
Outline
the genesis of the conflict
Numerous parallels are drawn between current affairs to
events after the 1991 split of the SPLA.
The White army, mobilized in 1991, deployed against the SPLA and
surrounding communities and has once again been mobilized. The 1991 split also led to a proliferation of
militia groups and a series of intra-clan and inter-tribal fighting that
devastated entire communities in Upper Nile, Greater Bahr el Ghazal and Jonglei.
Peace conferences, specifically Waat (1999) and Liliir
(2000) conferences were organized in the 1990s to support community
reconciliation and initiate dialogue with political and militia groups within
South(ern) Sudan. Agreements from these conferences were never honored. The levels of conflict in Upper Nile and Jonglei (including those between the Lou
Nuer, Murle and Dinka Bor) of the past few years and the speed at which the White Army has been mobilized,
suggest that there remain
outstanding/unresolved issues.
Neither the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 nor the
more recent policy of amnesty and accommodation redressed acts of violence perpetrated
against the communities. Instead, these had the effect of positioning military
authority above community models of hierarchy. In
fact it might be true to state that the White Army was never (fully)
demobilized and remained a standing army.
This might explain origin(s) of anger toward the government.
However, there remains a need to (also) critically analyze and document events
that immediately ignited the conflict. We need to determine the number of those
who died in Juba at the beginning of the conflict, and establish a tally of
those dead nationwide. The lack of credible figures also sustains this conflict.
2.
Identify
a neutral facilitator
A process of engagement requires a neutral facilitator;
one respected by the communities and that is politically neutral. In the 1990s
and early 2000s, it was the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), an ecumenical
body, which facilitated peace and reconciliation, and provided logistical and
financial support for people-to-people dialogue - the most successful of these
being Wunlit in 1999.
Currently, the Local Government Act (2009) Section 121, proscribes the
role of a ‘Southern Sudan
Council of Traditional Authority Leaders’ to ‘foster peace building and resolution of conflicts
through mediation and other conciliatory mechanisms.’
It
is not clear how effective this council has been and how wide it is in scope.
There
remains a need to identify an impartial, recognized and respected body
to facilitate (meaningful) community processes as outlined below, be it the
NSCC or an alternative body.
3.
Identify
those in positions of authority and influence
It will be imperative to identify those in leadership and
authority positions for effective mobilization of community support for
dialogue, to represent community interests and ensure implementation of any
agreements reached. For example, the Wunlit Peace Process (1999) was initiated
after a meeting of 8 Dinka and Nuer chiefs in Lokichogio, Kenya in 1998, after
8 years of internecine conflict between the DInka (of Bahr el Ghazal) and Nuer
(of Western Upper Nile). The chiefs then led a series of community meetings to
mobilize support for a wider peace process, culminating in the construction of
a temporary village to house over 1,200 participants at Wunlit.
Identifying those
in positions of moral ascendency, ascertaining their levels of influence, finding
neutral venue(s) for dialogue and convincing parties to meet will be difficult,
but is critical. A necessary (first) step will be meeting with Nuer chiefs
to foment broad support for dialogue. Given
the mobilization of the White Army, and hierarchical organization of the Nuer,
the spiritual, youth and age-set leaders must be involved - perhaps the chiefs
can play a vital role as intermediaries.
4.
Mobilize
for community involvement and participation
Successful peace processes have involved significant levels
of public participation and minimal external mediation. For example, the 1994
Ikotos peace conference involved approximately 7,000 participants, Wunlit had
360 delegates and more than 1200 participants. Uniquely, the 1994 Akobo Lou-Jikany
Lou peace conference highlights the unique role women can play as part of a
‘truth commission’; women, considered to be maan
naaths, ensured that those testifying did so truthfully. Thus all community
stakeholders must participate.
Mobilizing for community support takes time and needs to
begin sooner rather than later. It took NSCC over 8 months to attain widespread
support for Wunlit.
A recommendation from the Waat and Liliir peace conferences
that was never implemented was the reestablishment of the Fangak conferences.
These were first convened in the 1940s in Western Upper Nile, and held every
five years (until 1971) and were opportunities for dialogue amongst all major
sections of the Nuer. The conferences resolved intra-communal issues, reviewed
customary law and discussed authority and leadership, including that of the
chiefs. Perhaps it is time to revitalize a similar discourse.
5.
Retain
independence from political and military actors
Grassroots conflict resolution and mediation must be
independent of negotiations happening in Addis Ababa and the political climate
in general. This is especially true because while the actors are politically
instigated, not all of them are politically motivated. Community members will ultimately
be responsible for engaging with those currently on the battlefields, in
monitoring any agreements and involvement of these same political and military actors
has the potential to derail the process. For example, leadership and military
wrangles among participating military actors derailed the Waat convention of
1999. The Liliir conference of 2000, also became politicized and both peace
initiatives failed to resolve conflicts on the Eastern bank of the Nile.
It is also assumed that the political issues will be
discussed and finalized in the IGAD-led process or similar processes at the
national level - what will remain outstanding are the concerns at the
grassroots.
6.
Gain
support from political and military institutions
While community peace-building initiatives must remain independent
of the political and military actors, agreements stemming from these will require
widespread support for a successful implementation. Support must come from the
political and military actors and therefore community members must be prepared
to advocate for this. Community support
for peaceful dialogue might apply pressure on military actors to cease
hostilities and begin meaningful dialogue.
7.
Develop
institutions to implement agreements
Local level peace agreements will outline key
recommendations to be implemented at grassroots and national level. In the
past, these have included the reestablishment of local courts systems,
restoring the authority of the chiefs where these have been eroded and
rebuilding civic administration, compensation for wrongful deaths,
demobilization and continuous cycles of dialogue, including calls for a
national dialogue. Adequately funded
institutions, capable of ensuring implementation of these recommendations must
be developed at the local, state and national level. These institutions will
also ensure that the priorities of the grassroots are represented at any
national peace and reconciliation efforts.
The steps outlined above are neither sequential nor
definitive, and can occur in tandem with [other] existing models for engagement
at the grassroots level. In addition, weaknesses and critiques of
community-level peace initiatives do abound. While this article does not
outline these weaknesses, it will be important to critically examine and
analyze them in order to develop a wholistic approach that leads to a greater
peace and reconciliation.
This article stems
from numerous informal conversations held in Juba, Nairobi and Addis and could
have greatly benefited from input from the Greater Upper Nile, Jonglei and Bahr
el Ghazal communities. It is written in the hope that we, as South Sudanese,
begin to expand our thinking beyond the Addis process. A multifaceted conflict requires multifarious
solutions.
Appendix: Peace-processes of times past
Fangak conference:
started in the 1940s and held in Western Upper Nile and amongst all major
sections of the Nuer. Subsequent meetings were held every 5 years to review and
modify customary law, with the last meeting convened in 1971. Later peace processes (e.g Waat and Liliir
below) have called for a re-establishment of the Fangak conferences.
1994 Ikotos conference
convened amongst the Lotuko, Didinga, Boya and Toposa communities to address
intercommmunal conflict, which had escalated after the 1991 SPLA split. It was
facilitated by the Catholic Diocese of Torit and involved approximately 7,000
participants. The conference resolved the issue of escalating dowry prices
(reducing these from 30 to 10 cows), established compensation for wrongful
deaths at 22 cows, and banned travelling outside one’s village while armed.
1994 Akobo Lou-Jikany
Lou peace conference: to address intra-tribal fighting between the Jikany
and Lou Nuer. It was facilitated by the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and
chaired by Nuer from Western Upper Nile, who also acted as judges in the civil
court. It included 500 official delegates and about 1500 observers. Uniquely, women (maan naaths), played an effective role in ensuring that those testifying did so truthfully. Approximately 9000
people travelled on foot to Liech to learn about the agreement
1998 Lokochoggio
Dinka-Nuer Chiefs meeting:
The Lokichogio peace workshop, organized by the New Sudan
Council of Churches (NSCC) in June, brought together for the first time in 7
years, 8 Dinka and Nuer chiefs from the east and west banks of the Nile, address
8 years of internecine violence between the Dinka (of Bahr el Ghazal) and Nuer
(of Western Upper Nile). The Loki peace accord led to an agreement to end
hostilities, and to hold a series of meetings amongst communities to discuss
modalities for peace. The led to the Wunlit Conference.
1999 Wunlit
Conference
Facilitated by the NSCC, which mobilized communities,
leaders, women, and youth over a period of 8 months. Immediately prior to the
conference, exchange visits between Dinka and Nuer chiefs were held to aspire
confidence in the process. The conference was attended by 360 delegates and also
included 6 Nuer chiefs and 2 Murle chiefs from east of the Nile. It was facilitated
by 6 rapporteurs from Nuer and Dinka. Recommendations fromWunlit included
establishment of joint border police and courts, joint schools, veterinary
centers, and establishment of a Dinka-Nuer peace council. It also called for a series of smaller
people-to-people meetings leading to a larger conference involving all the
peoples of South(ern) Sudan.
1999 Waat Convention
Facilitated by the NSCC immediately after Wunlit to bring
peace and reconciliation amongst the Nuer on the eastern bank of the Nile. The
Lou Nuer military commanders had signed a ceasefire in Akobo in August, and
formed an Upper Nile Military Command Council (UMCC). The Lou Peace and
Governance Convention in Waat in Nov 1999, was meant to build upon the Akobo
military agreement, create a common system of governance by rebuilding the
civil administration and reconcile the Lou Nuer. More than 3,000 people attended.
However as the main delegates were military leaders- focus became Lou leadership
and military issues and the Waat peace agreement was not lasting.
Liliir Conference May
2000
An East-Bank wide conference located in Liliir in Dinka Bor
territory, perceived as neutral territory. While this was a multi-ethnic
meeting, only half of invited delegates attended. In addition, military
commanders were full participants, not observers and the conference became
politicized. Liliir was also not successful in resolving the Eastern Bank
conflicts.
References:
1.
Anon. Indigenous Conflict Management Mechanisms.
1995.
2.
Bradbury,
Mark; et al. Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study. Rift
Valley Institute: 2006
3. Best
Practices and Tools for Community-Based Peacebuilding in South Sudan - July
2002. The HOPE Project: July 2002.
4.
“Leading from Behind.” A strategic
review of the Southern Sudanese People to People Peace Process and the support
role NSCC is undertaking.
New Sudan Council of Churches, July August 2000
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