Yau Yau rebels sign ceasefire

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49787

as a friend commented, "Is there any group left out so the govt can sign CoH with them."

This is just getting ridiculous

“Yau Yau rebelled against South Sudan’s ruling party (SPLM) after the April 2010 elections when, as an independent candidate, he lost his campaign to represent Gumuruk–Boma constituency in Pibor county at Jonglei state assembly.

In 2011, however, he joined the SPLA, but rebelled again in April 2012. After an increase in violence in Pibor county, the army announced it was suspending the civilian disarmament campaign in the area to focus on nullifying the rebellion.”

We believe he will respect this agreement?  This amnesty shit has to stop.

we should be ashamed of ourselves

https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/malakal-shadow-death

How can we call this a cessation of hostilities?

When there are reports like…

Lakes

25^th Jan: Fighting in and around Awerial

26^th Jan:  Fighting in Awerial County in Kalthok. Rebel troops heading north to join forces in Unity state and using civilians as a shield.

Bentiu

23^rd Jan: Government forces steal sorghum from WFP warehouse

25^th -27^th Jan:  Heavy fighting around Thar Jath. Government forces pushing rebel forces towards Leer, civilians caught in the cross-fire.

28^th Jan: Heavy shelling in Leer by government forces 

 Juba

26^th Jan: 40 minutes shooting in the barracks of New Site - apparently by drunken soldiers firing into the air.

Bor

26^th Jan: Government forces attack rebel forces in Matiang 

27^th Jan: Jalle and Kolmerek changes hands between rebel forces and government forces.

Upper Nile 

25^th Jan:  Government forces attack Obel, south of Malakal. Rebels capture Doleib Hill.

27^th Jan:  Shilluk replace the Nuer governor with a Shilluk governor

In the middle of all this are the very civilians whose lives we want to protect. What is the meaning of a ceasefire agreement that neither side respects?  What then will be the point of starting political dialogue Feb 7^th when our people are still dying and are afraid to go home? I mean, even with reports of Juba being safe – we still have a significant population of South Sudanese afraid to go home, because they are certain they will be killed. We are letting down our own selves.

Addis Ababa... thoughts

I was in Addis for a few days last week and left the day after the signing of the agreements.

A few things on my mind, since;

-       The level of personalization (if that is a word) of what is now a national crisis is tragic. Speaking to the SPLM/A in Opposition negotiators, a lot of talk was focused on, ‘I lost this’, ‘or I was frustrated in parliament’ or ‘my brother was shot in Juba’, or ‘I will not go back to Juba unless Kiir goes’.  This made it difficult to even ask that we stop navel-gazing and look at the wider issues, especially the suffering of innocent civilians, not involved in the conflict.  It also made me wonder if it is at all possible to negotiate in what is clearly an extremely emotional and hostile environment. What exactly will this political dialogue be about? Are we only looking to settle scores?

-       On the government side, it is quite clear that they perceive this as an abrogation of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. By this, the government is not necessarily focusing on the failures of the SPLM party to contain its internal differences, but on the actions following.  The GRSS is also quite clear that the detainees will have to be tried in court. There has been little acknowledgement of any extra-judicial killings that might have happened – and this is wrong. We hold the government to a much higher standard – many of us fear that the government did let us down.

-       There was no push by either side to ensure that the accused persons would receive a fair and honest day in court. We all agree that the judicial system in South Sudan is flawed, and that we lack an independent judiciary. Given this, even if the GRSS has credible evidence to try the accused persons, it will be difficult for us as South Sudanese to accept the rulings of a court system we have little faith in. There should have been mechanisms to ensure that any trials would be of the highest standard to ensure we can respect these rulings.

-       The day after the signing of the agreements, accusations went back and forth about breaking of the terms of the agreement. The White Army –underage children with very little understanding of the political issues that drove them to rebellion in the first place, were on the BBC stating their intentions to continue fighting until they install Riek Machar as president.  The government was [accused of] trying to capture as much territory as possible, before the agreement actually went into force, within 24hrs. This was depressing –this meant that innocent civilians were still dying and that perhaps we were too optimistic.

-       We hope that IGAD does take forward our recommendation that a regional body of inquiry is set up to establish the veracity of the Dec 15^th & 16^th events. There are too many versions going around and too many people (Rebecca Garang, hello) taking advantage of this to do quite a bit of posturing. We need to establish what started this madness, it is important to hold accountable any persons that violated the law – i.e. any party to extra-judicial killings, lootings etc.  Since we became a republic, we like to state that, ‘we are not in the bush, anymore’, we need this clearly understood.

-       We all agree that we need inclusion of key stakeholders in the mediation/ negotiation process. Some of us don’t feel like the teams currently involved have any remaining credibility- and so what we need to be doing right now, is advocating for our inclusion, and developing modalities for inclusion. It is not enough to say- we need civil society, religious leaders, women etc. This is too vague. We need to rally around stakeholders we feel will hold our interests to heart, and will not be using this as an opportunity for individual gain (unfortunately, many of our leaders, do not look beyond the personal).

One overall question I have though, given that this started as an issue within a political party that became a national crisis, do we give these failings legitimacy by taking it to the international level? I am wondering if the role of IGAD and other such institutions is to resolve the internal problems  I should say failures of political parties and persons. For example, David Yau Yau’s negotiating team was in Addis as well. We are not sure if he wants IGAD to carve him a state in South Sudan. But is the sign of things to come? We will all run to the international stage whenever there are issues like this? At what point do certain actions become unconstitutional and where does sovereignty begin and end?

I have more to say on this, but I still need to flesh out my thoughts. I just know that it does not feel right that political dialogue will be mediated on the IGAD stage. For example, are they going to go through the SPLM constitution and manifesto? Are they going to discuss the legislature, the judiciary and the executive organs of government in Addis? Are they discussing power sharing?  Are they going to discuss the establishment of political parties? Are they going to be revising the Transitional Constitution?  Are these not issues that should be discussed in Juba- with the full involvement of the citizenry- who after all have a bigger stake in all this, and who voted and will be voting (insh’allah) come 2015? I’m puzzled.

what does a cessation of hostilities agreement entail, in this current context?

Now that a cessation of hostilities is imminent (we assume), perhaps we as Junubin need to understand what a ceasefire negotiation process entails- if we are to be able participants and not mere observers in this process. Many of us have demands that we would like to see represented at the negotiating table and any future agreements.

In addition, we need to understand how the strengths of the parties at the negotiating table at the time of negotiation, will affect the overall process and success of the agreement reached, as pertains to reduction in violence.

As things stand, it appears that the G.O.S.S is waiting until it is assured of having the upper hand before signing any ceasefire agreement. (It is notable that the G.O.S.S committed to signing the cessation of hostilities agreement, after the recapture of Bor, and the imminent recapture of Malakal. This leaves the (other) negotiating party holding fewer cards with which to bargain with. Regardless of what side we stand on, assuming that we care about the greater majority of South Sudanese who are impacted by this conflict, there are a few concerns...

http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/36Negotiatingceasefires-MPS.pdf

1. The signing of this agreement might not necessary lead to complete cessation of hostilities or reduction in violence– this will depend mainly on the ability of those on the negotiating table to control the actors on the ground- and this will include the SPLA if we consider extra-judicial killings. There are many questions about how much control the rebel leaders have over their forces- signing the cessation of hostilities agreement will prove to us their strength vis a vis the forces on the ground.  For me, it might also be a very scary revelation of the anarchy that has been unleashed in the country.  I refuse to believe that any sane leader, regardless of their overall intentions, would knowingly unleash the widespread lootings, killings, pillaging and plundering that we have seen- including the burning down of Bentiu, Bor and Malakal towns. But perhaps I give them too much credit?

“Negotiating ceasefires does not imply that armed groups no longer see their military capability as a core source of leverage with the state”

Given that the G.O.S.S has recaptured the strategic towns of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal, what leverage remains for the negotiating teams?  To be honest, I am still waiting to see what the key demands of the negotiators (outside of the unconditional release of the 11) will be. At this point in time, will this be a negotiation for clemency and power sharing?

Or will this be an opportunity for this….

“They may need time, for example to re-supply weapons and ammunition, re-deploy military personnel, hire and train new recruits or gather intelligence on the enemy’s forces.”

Signifying the beginning of a protracted conflict, and widespread insecurity? This is not what we signed up for.

I found these points in the article, interesting.

What goes into a ceasefire agreement?

·      De-escalation measures. These disengage forces and minimize contact between armed forces.

·      Definition of what constitutes a ceasefire violation.

·      Monitoring, incident verification and dispute settlement mechanisms.

·      The geographic coverage of the ceasefire as well as a specific timeframe for implementation.

·      Specific concerns for the protection of civilians.

·      Bans on verbal attacks. [including] “use civilised and dignified language”  and avoid[ance of] “hostile propaganda and incitement to military action”

·      How the ceasefire is linked to the rest of the peace process. This may include

·      political and security transformation processes (e.g. disarmament and security sector reform).

·      Additional clauses most often make provision for unhindered access for humanitarian assistance and stipulate modalities for the release, or exchange, of prisoners.

Reading the many demands made by civil society groups, and addressed to the negotiating teams and mediators, it is clear that these are things we are already beginning to think about. Specifically monitoring the implementation of any agreement coming out of Addis, overall reform of the SPLA – and in this I refer to the recent request by Equatorians for a more inclusive and representative national army and government- which is long overdue, the formation of humanitarian corridors, so that those who are currently living in abominable conditions have access to basic human needs, and the protection of civilians- something that has been completely lacking from both sides of the conflict. However, again the question of what leverage the (other) negotiating team currently has to offer, remains critical. While they might make demands, why should the government team listen, given that they control a significant part of what was rebel strongholds? Will this be an incentive for a return to violence in order to obtain a bargaining chip? Will this mean that any investigation that occurs to determine the scale and level of violence will be biased and therefore completely unacceptable to most of us. Or will this mean that things will return to business as usual, once we stop paying attention? (Something that I feel might be the outcome of this- and that in a few months we will be asking ourselves, now what was that about? I don’t believe we can afford this level of apathy)

One thing not mentioned in this, and something that I think about constantly is this; what happens to the youth who were mobilized and convinced to take up arms?  Or those who acted on orders that resulted in breaking the law of the land? What happens to soldiers who deserted? How will we address this?

This is also tied in to the question of accountability; which affects both the government troops and the rebel troops. Many of us believe that any and all atrocities committed during this month of anarchy, have to be accounted for. This includes any extra-judicial killings, burning and looting of private and public property, ambushes of civilians by armed groups, etc. However, we do need an environment that allows for the investigation of crimes allegedly committed. But, after this, does accountability mean that those held responsible are jailed? Because we do not have the capacity to jail all these people, and there are valid concerns about judicial due process. Does this mean that those found responsible will compensate (in so far as they can) those affected?  Because, given the scale of destruction, this might not be feasible (even though I believe they need to pay for the reconstruction of the towns destroyed- this should not be from public coffers). Or does this mean that we have to think about community-level mediation and compensation efforts? And how do we set these up so they are credible and acceptable?

What happens when it becomes impossible to actually implement a cessation of hostilities agreement? What this article calls the ‘Blind Spots”

In some cases, governments and third parties fail to grasp that an armed group’s inability to comply with some of the requirements of a ceasefire does not necessarily mean that it rejects the ceasefire itself. It could be that its own characteristics impede implementation.

This may be because combatants will not accept/ comply with what is demanded of them, or because the group’s organisational structure renders implementation impossible.

In any context in which an armed group or groups are composed of a network of tactically independent formations, groups or cells (or simply amorphous entities with loose command and control), some standard ceasefire mechanisms become extremely difficult to implement

Ceasefires pose practical difficulties for conflict parties. Their implementation requires efficient communication to the rank and file in sometimes difficult terrain.

I fear that this might be the case in this situation. Who actually controls the ‘White Army’?  And in my ignorance, who exactly is the White Army? If, as is rumoured, the White Army is controlled by a spiritual leader (who is not represented at the negotiating table), how do we engage with this spiritual leader? And how much authority does he yield over the mobilized youths? What are his demands? If it is true that the White Army mobilized to avenge deaths in Juba, at what point/ or what number of vengeful deaths constitute restitution?

Ceasefire monitoring arrangements

Another question I have: how will this cessation of hostilities agreement be implemented and who will monitor it? How will violations be reported (given the communication challenges existent in South Sudan?)? And more importantly, what constitutes a violation? Does it involve only violations by the actors who sign the agreement (and therefore groups not represented in Addis can continue without repercussions?), or is this any and all reported acts of violence. An example is the cattle rustling that has happened in Lakes and Warrap (I believe) states. These have not really been in support of this political crisis. How do we define what is what?

We all agree that local monitoring teams must include civil society, traditional leaders, community groups and any other key stakeholders, but whom exactly will we identify to sit on this team, and how will they ensure that peace is maintained?  What resources will the monitoring team require and who will ultimately pay for this?   And the even bigger question, given the bargaining power that the government currently holds, are these questions even relevant today? Can we talk of ‘cessation of hostilities’ given today’s rapidly changing context, or are we talking about conditions of surrender?

Ceasefires and disarmament

Planning for disarmament as part of the ceasefire negotiation in effect amounts to modifying the balance of power between the conflict parties.

“Militants fear that if they agree to a ceasefire first and, more, lay down arms, they would lose all leverage against the government in the negotiations that follow and would be in a hopeless situation if it reneged on its assurances”

Again I ask, what leverage does [each] negotiating team currently have? The balance of power has shifted significantly in the past two days, with the government seemingly left holding all the cards.

I believe that disarmament is necessary and has been for a long time- and today especially given the numerous credible stories of lootings and thefts conducted by groups taking advantage of the current chaos.  But we also have seen the failures of previous disarmament efforts… In some places, disarmament actually led to an increase in levels of aggression and hostilities (Jonglei State being a key example)

This article talks about the Mitchell principles, as being mechanism to resolve this.

Introduce the Mitchell principles

They entail i) resolving political issues by democratic and exclusively peaceful means;

This is all well and good, but do they apply in this context? Resolving political issues democratically – this was a political crisis gone awry. Mechanisms to resolve political disputes (both within SPLM and the parliament) were ignored. Not only that, it is unclear whether the decision to lead a rebellion was endorsed in a democratic process (ok, i believe that this was a case of the personal ambitions of a few superseding the needs and wants of the majority). 

ii) disarming all paramilitary organisations

what does this actually mean? And who are the current paramilitary groups?

iii) submitting such disarmament to verification by an independent body ;

disarmament- almost impossible in the south sudan context. Previous disamarment of groups actually led to increase in hostilities by other groups who were not disarmed and who took advantage of the situation to begin cattle rustling (our national hobby). 

iv) renouncing and opposing efforts to use force or threaten to use force to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations ;

Agreed. In this case, are we talking about the government negotiating team?

v) abiding by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and resorting only to democratic and peaceful means to try and alter aspects they may disagree with ; vi) urging that “punishment” killings and violence stop and taking effective steps to prevent such actions.

 How do we even begin to define this?

I have more questions than answers, I guess. I am curious to see what happens over the next few weeks. The context is much changed from what it was last week. Who knows what next week will bring?